Abstract:
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the roles and duties of the Committee of Special Case Inquiry Official (CISO) in respect of the Section 37 (2) and (3) of the Special Case Investigation Act, B.E. 2547 (2004) in exercising, not granting an annual salary increase to special case inquiry officials and the disciplinary proceedings only. This is done by studying relevant concepts and theories and comparing with other agencies of characteristics similar to the DSIs committees, including both domestic and foreign agencies, in order to point out the formats and characteristics suitable for the DSIs structure
The study found that the procedures under Section 37 of the Special Case Investigation Act, B.E. 2547 (2004) Its amendments were stipulated that the superiors discretion for subjecting special case inquiry officials to disciplinary actions. The Committee is legally assigned to consider the said matters prior to the issuance of administrative orders by the authorized officers. However, this provision is special that it does not give the Committee the power to enforce and the superiors are not obliged to comply with the opinions of the Committee. Instead, the superiors authorized to issue administrative orders must comply with resolutions of the Civil Service Commission Common Subcommittee in accordance with the Civil Service Act, B.E. 2551 (2008), which is comprised of agencys internal members as the majority of the members. This renders the Committee of Special Case Inquiry Official (CISO) powerless or unable to protect the special case inquiry officials as intended. Therefore, the law should be amended in respect of the aforementioned provision by stipulating a legal provision to improve the composition and increase the power of the Committee of Special Case Inquiry Official (CISO) to supersede those of the Civil Service Commission Common Subcommittee as well as to reduce the steps to a proper lever in order to adhere to the intent of the law and eliminate unnecessary and excessive procedures