The Influence of Management Shareholding on M&A Performance - the Moderating Effect based on Managerial Overconfidence

Name: Xucheng Kong

Organization : Panyapiwat Institute of Management

Email : 4069339291@qq.com

keyword: Management shareholding

; Managerial overconfidence

; M&A performance

; Weakening effect

Abstract: The A-share listed information technology companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2012 to 2016 were selected as the object of study to investigate the effect of management shareholding on M&A performance from a rational perspective. The mechanisms by which managerial overconfidence works on management shareholding and M&A performance were analyzed by integrating rationality and bounded rationality. The results show that management shareholding is positively correlated with M&A performance, i.e. the growing level of managerial share ownership can improve M&A performance. Moreover, the positive impact of management shareholding on M&A performance will be weakened by managerial overconfidence, i.e. managerial overconfidence has a “weakening effect” on the influence of management shareholding on M&A performance. The findings can be used to guide corporate governance, incentive mechanism and manager appointment in M&A decisions. In addition, most of studies on M&A are based on either rationality assumption or bounded rationality assumption. Our study expands the current theory by integrating both rationality and bounded rationality to investigate the influence of managerial overconfidence on M&A.

ีUMT Poly Journal

Address: UBON RATCHATHANI

Email: library@umt.ac.th

Name: Tienan Wang

Role: Advisor

Created: 2564

Modified: 2021-01-14

Issued: 2021-01-14

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application/pdf

eng

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