Abstract:
The objective of this interdisciplinary study is to test hypothesis on practice of the member states in accruing benefits under the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. In so doing, the study on formal power relationship between the developed and the developing under the DSU will be observed with political economy analytical framework. Member states possess the rationality in seeking the site of exploitation which is derived from political supporters within state. The theories are also applied in analyzing the DSU to propose the concept of accumulating wealth for core capitalist countries particularly the United States and the European Union. The test on dispute cases suggested that the DSU significantly allows the intervention of political and power factors in several processes. The superior members, therefore, tend to exploit the system by retaining protective measures and incurring economic costs on others. It is essential for the WTO then to rethink about promoting a more formally judicial role and taking into account an economic dimension of the DSU in order to deal with power unbalancing and to restrict the opportunity cost arises from measure at dispute, which has been posted on the developing who eventually wins the case.