Family affair?-insider trading and family firms : evidence from Thailand

Name: Rapeepat Ingkasit

keyword: Insider trading

LCSH: Family-owned business enterprises -- Finanace

; Family firms

LCSH: Family-owned business enterprises -- Thailand

; Blackout policy

; Corporate governance

Abstract: I analyze the price reaction to insiders’ transactions in Thailand and whether the reaction depends on the firm’s ownership, control and governance structure. I find that the insiders can earn significant abnormal returns from trading shares of their firms. The effect is more pronounced when trades occurred prior to earnings announcement. The results provide reasoning for regulation that prohibits the insiders to trade prior to earnings announcement. The difference in legal definition of insiders, ownership structure and regulatory surveillance mechanism may explain the observed smaller abnormal returns compare to developed countries. Both family ownership and control structure affect the magnitude of market reaction. The findings support the entrenchment effect in family firms. The existence of specific categories of blockholder have monitoring effect while some types of blockholder seem to follow insiders’ signal and strengthen the market reaction. The significant reduction in abnormal returns earned by the insiders of the firm with voluntary blackout policy suggests that the policy effectively forbids the insiders to trade when they possess valuable information that is not available to the public

Thammasat University. Thammasat University Library

Address: BANGKOK

Email: preserv@tu.ac.th

Name: Arnat Leemakdej

Role: advisor

Created: 2017

Modified: 2564-04-23

Issued: 2021-04-22

วิทยานิพนธ์/Thesis

application/pdf

DOI: 10.14457/TU.the.2017.1

eng

DegreeName: Master of Science

Level: Master's Degree

Descipline: Finance

Grantor: Thammasat University

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